In its just concluded term, the Supreme Court of the United States overturned its 40-year-old Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. decision in a landmark case called Loper Bright Enterprises et al v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al. In this article, Associate Tyffani Lauve discusses what the Loper Bright decision means for the future Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) claims.
How LHWCA Claims Were Handled Under Chevron
Chevron established the “Chevron Doctrine” or “Chevron Deference.” That 1984 decision held that, when considering the application of a federal statute, courts should give deference to the interpretation of the administrative agency charged by Congress with implementing the statute. Presuming that agency has unique expertise in the subject matter of the statute, the courts were to give weight to the “permissible” agency interpretations of the statutes those agencies administer.
Under the LHWCA and its extensions, the interpretation of the Secretary of Labor would be given greater weight. The Secretary, of course, acts through the Director of the Office of Workers Compensation (OWCP), and is represented by the Office of the Solicitor of Labor, a party to every longshore claim. Courts were instructed to defer to the Director of OWCP and his or her counsel (the Solicitor) to resolve ambiguities within the relevant statutes. That Chevron deference has now been overturned.
An Overview of The Chevron Framework and Loper’s Change
For context, the Chevron Court initially held that, even when a reviewing court reads the statute differently, that court should defer to “permissible” agency interpretations. Inherent in this ruling was the Court’s recognition that the administering agency should be expert in the relevant subject matter and thus the most qualified to resolve statutory ambiguities.
The Chevron Doctrine required a two-step framework to interpret statutes administered by federal agencies. First, a court was required to determine whether a statute was silent or ambiguous as to an issue in dispute. Second, the court would defer to the agency’s interpretation if based on a permissible construction of the statute. That standard has been rejected.
Under Loper Bright, courts will be required to “independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 18. In its ruling, the Court now stated that “agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities. Courts do.” Id at 23.
What does Loper Bright mean for the future?
As a practical matter, the interpretation of the Longshore Act and its extensions by the Director of OWCP almost uniformly favored compensability of claims and increasing benefits to workers. In very few instances, an interpretation of the statute favored employers and carriers. This raises the question of what will happen going forward, when the position of assumed experts in the field are no longer given deference. Of course, Congress can clarify any statute by amendment, but the Longshore Act has only been significantly amended three times since it was enacted in 1927, and it is unlikely to be the focus of any Congress.
The Loper Bright decision does not mean courts are forbidden from taking agency interpretations into consideration. The Director, OWCP will no doubt continue to advocate his or her position on implementing the Act. But Loper Bright will undoubtedly “level the playing field” on legal issues that previously were sloped in favor of extending the scope of the Act as a result of Chevron. Employers and Carriers should be on equal footing in advocating for the interpretation of the Longshore Act and the plain meaning of the statute as enacted by Congress.