Brief Look

The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in Breaux v. Worrell, 141 F.4th 712 (5th Cir.), requested certification of the following two questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court:

1. Is an employee of a city of another state—working under an agreement for emergency assistance between that city and a Louisiana municipality—a “representative” of the State of Louisiana or one of its political subdivisions within the meaning of La. R.S. 29:735?
2. Is an individual providing emergency assistance in Louisiana “engaging in … emergency preparedness and recovery activities” under La. R.S. 29:735 while commuting from the recovery site to his lodging?

The Louisiana Supreme Court resolved the first question by finding that Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (LHSEADA), La. R.S. 29:721 et seq., does not include within its definition of “representative” the defendant in the underlying action and, consequently, found it unnecessary to consider the second certified question.

Background and Certified Questions

The action arose from a September 2021 automobile accident. Following Hurricane Ida, Terrebonne Parish requested assistance from Lafayette Utilities Systems (“LUS”) in restoring power to Houma. LUS in turn requested assistance from the City of Wilson, North Carolina, on behalf of Terrebonne Parish. Terrebonne Parish and the City of Wilson signed agreements regarding the emergency assistance.

Because of a shortage of hotels in Houma, City of Wilson employees dispatched to Houma stayed in Lafayette and commuted to Houma daily. The accident occurred when an employee and resident of the City of Wilson, Kevin Worrell, was driving a truck owned by the City of Wilson back to Lafayette after completing his work for the day repairing power lines in Houma. Worrell ran a red light and collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle, resulting in injuries.

Plaintiffs filed suit in St. Mary Parish against Worrell, the City of Wilson, and their insurer. Defendants removed the case to federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction and filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Worrell was entitled to immunity under the LHSEADA. The federal district court granted the motion, finding Worrell was acting within the purview of the immunity provision at the time of the accident.

On appeal, the U.S. Fifth Circuit requested certification of two questions: (1) Is an employee of a city of another state — working under an agreement for emergency assistance between that city and a Louisiana municipality — a “representative” of the State of Louisiana or one of its political subdivisions within the meaning of La. R.S. 29:735? and (2) Is an individual providing emergency assistance in Louisiana “engaging in … emergency preparedness and recovery activities” under La. R.S. 29:735 while commuting from the recovery site to his lodging?

Louisiana Supreme Court Holdings and Analysis

The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted certification under La. Sup. Ct. Rule XII.

To address the first question, the Court considered whether Worrell was a “representative” – an undefined term – of a Louisiana governmental entity for purposes of the LHSEADA. The Court considered how the term “representative” is used in various other contexts, including the Louisiana Administrative Code and the Civil Code, and in the concepts of mandate and agency in Louisiana law.

Under these general authorities, the Court identified the pertinent issues as follows:

• Worrell’s work in Louisiana was the result of a contract between the City of Wilson and the Parish of Terrebonne
• The provisions of the contract prohibited the entities acting under the contract from acting on behalf of, or as the agent of, one another.
• The provisions of the contract also expressly stated that officials and employees of the City of Wilson would remain so, at all times and for all purposes, while working in Louisiana.
• Ultimately, no evidence in the record established that Worrell received any actual or apparent authority to represent the State of Louisiana or its political subdivisions.
• And, even if a Louisiana actor attempted to empower Worrell with some type of representative authority, such action would be ineffective and ultra vires act.

Accordingly, the Court concluded Worrell could not be considered a “representative” of any Louisiana governmental entity, and thus was not entitled to immunity under the LHSEADA.

Because the Court concluded that Worrell did not meet the LHSEADA requirement of status as a representative or employee of the state, any political subdivision thereof, or other state agency, that failure alone disqualifies him for immunity under the statute, and consideration of the second certified question was unnecessary.

Justice Cole concurred and wrote separately to emphasize one manner in which “representative” status under the Act may arise under Louisiana law and to propose a “nexus test” for determining when conduct falls within “emergency preparedness and recovery activities.”

Judge Allison Penzato, pro tempore, also concurred but opined that the majority’s view exceeded the scope of the legal question presented by considering facts and evidence outside of those presented by the U.S. Fifth Circuit. She also would have answered the second question.

Takeaways

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding and analysis in Breaux highlights the ability of parties to establish their intent through the contractual terms, so long as it is consistent with legal principles. Thus, the relevant contract expressly stated that all North Carolina-based personnel furnished to work in Louisiana would be “conclusively deemed, for all purposes, to remain officials and employees of [the City of Wilson, North Carolina] … while providing aid hereunder and while traveling to and from a Beneficiary to provide aid,” and “such personnel shall retain all rights, privileges, immunities and benefits … as they enjoy while performing their normal duties” for the City of Wilson.

Although the term was undefined in the LHSEADA, the Court also looked to bedrock foundations of Louisiana law, including the definitions of mandataries and agents in the Civil Code, as well as statutory law, to establish the relevant meaning.

Edward F. Breaux, Jr. v. Kevin Ray Worrell, 2025-CQ-00856 (La. 04/10/2026) [21 pp.]