Article Summary

• In Jeffboat, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of Longshore benefits to a former shipyard painter who alleged that years of exposure to paint fumes, sandblasting materials, and other workplace irritants contributed to his pulmonary impairment.
• This decision provides an important reminder for employers and carriers that successfully rebutting the Section 20(a) presumption does not end the causation analysis. Once rebutted, the presumption drops from the case, and the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) must weigh the evidence as a whole to determine whether the claimant established causation by a preponderance of the evidence.
• For employers and carriers, Jeffboat underscores the importance of obtaining a well-reasoned medical opinion that identifies alternative causes for a claimant’s condition and also explains why the alleged workplace exposures did not cause, contribute to, or aggravate the claimant’s particular injury.

Background

Claimant, Calvin Chaffers, worked for Employer, Jeffboat, Inc., from 2005 through 2017 as a painter, paint quality inspector, and paint supervisor. Claimant alleged repeated exposure to fumes and particles from toxic paints, paint thinner, antifreeze, welding, gouging, sandblasting, and other materials. Claimant subsequently sought benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) for pulmonary impairment allegedly resulting from these exposures.

Complicating the causation analysis, Claimant had a lengthy smoking history and several underlying health conditions, including hypertension, obesity, asthma, sleep apnea, lupus, and HIV. His treating physician diagnosed Claimant with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (“COPD”) and emphysema, in addition to numerous other conditions.

The parties presented competing medical opinions regarding Claimant’s pulmonary condition. Claimant’s expert, Dr. Ankit Gupta, diagnosed Claimant with COPD and emphysema, found moderate restrictive lung function, and assigned a 14% pulmonary impairment. Dr. Gupta further concluded that Claimant’s workplace exposures caused his emphysema and contributed to his resulting disability.

Employer’s expert, Dr. William Frazier, disagreed, concluding that Claimant did not have COPD, restrictive pulmonary disease, or pulmonary fibrosis. Dr. Frazier opined that Claimant’s breathing difficulties were unrelated to his employment and were more likely attributable to other conditions, including a potentially undiagnosed cardiac condition.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Claimant successfully invoked the Section 20(a) presumption but also found that Employer successfully rebutted the presumption through Dr. Frazier’s opinion. The presumption therefore dropped from the case, requiring Claimant to establish causation by a preponderance of the evidence based on the record as a whole.

Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The ALJ ultimately favored Dr. Gupta’s opinion over Dr. Frazier’s and concluded that Claimant’s pulmonary impairment was causally related to his employment. The Benefits Review Board affirmed, and Employer appealed to the Seventh Circuit.

The Seventh Circuit first rejected Employer’s challenge to Claimant’s invocation of the Section 20(a) presumption. The court explained that a claimant need only produce “some evidence” of a physical harm and workplace conditions that could have caused that harm. The court characterized this as a “light burden” and explained that a claimant does not need to establish a specific diagnosed condition to demonstrate an injury under the Longshore Act.

More significantly, the court upheld the ALJ’s decision to credit Dr. Gupta after Employer successfully rebutted the presumption. The ALJ found Dr. Gupta’s opinion more persuasive because it was thoroughly explained and supported by medical literature. In contrast, the ALJ found that Dr. Frazier relied upon normal pulmonary testing while failing to address abnormal results suggesting decreased functionality.

The court also identified an important omission in Employer’s medical evidence. Dr. Frazier acknowledged that long-term unprotected exposure to certain paints, antifreeze, and sandblasting materials could cause lung disease, but did not explain why those exposures did not cause or contribute to Claimant’s breathing issues. The court further rejected Employer’s reliance on Claimant’s smoking history and preexisting conditions, explaining that a claimant may recover where workplace conditions aggravate a preexisting condition or contribute to a worsening of symptoms. Ultimately, the existence of a preexisting condition does not preclude recovery under the Longshore Act if workplace conditions aggravate or contribute to Claimant’s condition.

Finding the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, the Seventh Circuit declined to reweigh the competing medical opinions and affirmed the award of permanent partial disability benefits.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jeffboat demonstrates that rebutting the Section 20(a) presumption is only one step in successfully defending causation under the Longshore Act. Although Employer presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, Claimant ultimately prevailed when the ALJ weighed the medical evidence as a whole.

For employers and carriers, the Jeffboat decision highlights the importance of developing defense medical evidence with this second step of the analysis in mind. Identifying alternative causes, such as smoking or preexisting medical conditions, may rebut the presumption, but the expert should also explain why those conditions provide a more persuasive explanation for the claimant’s impairment than the alleged occupational exposures.

Where a defense expert acknowledges that a workplace exposure can cause or aggravate the claimed condition, the expert should specifically address why that exposure did not cause, contribute to, or aggravate the claimant’s particular condition. Jeffboat confirms that a thorough and claimant-specific causation analysis may ultimately determine which medical expert the ALJ credits once the Section 20(a) presumption is rebutted.