What Should I Do When…Juror Bias Has Tainted a Verdict

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is often referred to as the “Due Process Clause” for its prohibition of depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…” Of course, the Fifth Amendment applies to companies, as well as individuals, and both groups are certainly protected both inside and outside the courtroom. The focus of this article concerns the narrow issue of juror bias and whether its discovery requires a hearing or other indepth investigation into the otherwise impenetrable realm of jury deliberations.

In the matter of Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute, P.C., plaintiff was fired by a surgical clinic after speaking with a federal investigator concerning improprieties about how employees were compensated for overtime. She sued for wrongful termination, among other causes of action. The matter was tried before a jury, which awarded plaintiff $125,000, including $30,000 in actual damages and $95,000 in punitives.

After the jury was dismissed, a juror approached defense counsel and reported that during deliberations, another juror made anti-Semitic statements about a defense witness. Later, a different juror approached defense counsel and advised that several anti-Semitic statements were made, but did not specify exactly what was said. One of the jurors eventually submitted a sworn affidavit along these lines.

Armed with the affidavit, defense counsel filed a motion for new trial on several bases, including juror misconduct. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that jury deliberations are “sacrosanct” and that the juror’s alleged statements did not constitute misconduct requiring a new trial. The matter was eventually appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, which reversed the trial court in holding that in light of the jurors’ reports of religious bias towards one of the trial witnesses, the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to at least determine whether the offensive statements were made. If so, and assuming they were made during deliberations (as opposed to a lunch break or other occasion where the jury is “out”), “then the motion for new trial should be granted as the parties would have been deprived of their right to a trial by 12 fair and impartial jurors.” 304 S.W. 3d 81, 89-90 (Mo. 2/9/10).

The Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling in Fleshner is at odds with a 1785 English case where Lord Mansfield established a prohibition on juror testimony after learning that a jury he empaneled had reached a verdict by drawing lots. The “Mansfield Rule” generally provides that evidence about juror misconduct during deliberations may not be used to impeach a jury’s verdict.

How does the apparent contradiction between the Mansfield Rule and Fleshner affect the corporate litigant who fears that juror bias toward a defense witness or any other significant bias has interfered with the legal process and otherwise deprived the litigant of his or her Fifth Amendment right to due process? First, the litigant’s attorney must make sure he or she preserves a complete record of the bias from juror witnesses to the comments.  As with substantive trial issues, without a complete record of the bias, the issue may not be presented as an issue for appeal. 

Second, inherent in the attorney’s duty to preserve a complete record is the duty to uncover the details and develop them. In Fleshner, the issue concerned anti-Semitic remarks. In your case, the bias may concern race, religion, gender or any of several other types of prohibited bias. Regardless of how descriptive, crude or mean-spirited, it is probably not enough if the best your lawyer can do is to suggest that a witness was biased against your company in general.

Finally, be advised that in this author’s opinion, Fleshner is probably the exception, not the rule. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 606 expressly limits jurors to testifying only about whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention, whether any outside influence was brought to bear on any juror or whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. There is no federal “right” under the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to a full-blown post-trial evidentiary hearing whereby the losing party calls all the jurors as witnesses in an effort to make a case for bias in the deliberation room.

In the event you are involved in a situation concerning juror bias, we recommend contacting your attorney to address this issue.

~~ Patrick E. Costello ~~
pcostello@mblb.com

Georges Legrand serves at 100th Anniversary Jamboree of Boy Scouts

Heads Up

Author: Will Bland, IV

In a freak accident, a cable technician working in the street outside a hotel was struck by the falling body of a suicide victim who jumped from the hotel’s roof. The technician and the cable company sued the hotel alleging negligent maintenance of the rooftop safety rail. Plaintiffs argued that the rail was defective because several pickets on top of the fence were missing, and a previous suicide attempt should have provided the hotel with knowledge of a defect in the rail.

The court applied Louisiana’s law requiring building owners to keep their property free of vices or defects. In order to be held liable, the plaintiff must prove that a building owner 1) knew or should have known of the defect, 2) that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and 3) the building owner failed to exercise such reasonable care. Building owners have a duty to recognize that their building creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others and to take action to prevent that harm.

The appellate court found that the hotel was not liable because the owner did not know and could not have known of the defective guard rail. Plaintiffs offered no evidence that the hotel had sufficient warning of a defect in the rail and did not know of the suicide victim’s intent to jump off the roof. Furthermore, the defendant’s expert witness proved that the fence, while missing pickets in some areas, still exceeded the height required by applicable building codes.

Keller v. Monteleone Hotel, 2010 WL 2522725 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/23/10).